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Abstract
Codetermination (Mitbestimmung) in (West) Germany has been one of the most
controversial areas of political and economic conflict. When the CDU-led coalition
came to power in 1982, there was a widespread expectation that the powers and
privileges enjoyed by works councils (which had been significantly extended by the
outgoing coalition of Social Democrats and Liberals) would be restricted. The only
significant legislative assault on the institutions of Mitbestimmung, however, came in
the form of two relatively minor initiatives - to reform works council electoral law
(Minderheitenrechte) and to set up representative bodies for ‘middle management’
within firms (Sprecherausschüsse). Despite strong backing from various elements
within the coalition, however, these proposals, although eventually approved by
Parliament, were significantly diluted in the consultative process, and in their final
form have had almost no impact.
This paper examines the passage of these two proposals as a way of addressing the
broader question of why ‘neoliberalism’ (in particular the anti-union agenda) made so
little progress in West Germany during the 1980s. It rejects the common political
science explanation that policy radicalism in  Germany is inhibited by federalism and
a culture of consensual policy-making.  In its place, it suggests two factors that are
responsible for frustrating radical change. Firstly, the complex bargaining between
coalition partners that was required to construct a legislative majority entailed a
series of trade-offs that watered down the main thrust of the two proposals.
Secondly, more significantly (and from an Anglo-American perspective more
surprisingly), German employers were opposed to the very reforms that the
conservative government claimed would advantage them.  This opposition can only
be understood by examining the distinctive incentives and constraints facing
employers in a co-ordinated production regime.
Zusammenfassung
Unter allen wirtschaftlichen und politischen Auseinandersetzungen in Deutschland
wurde von jeher der Streit um die Mitbestimmung am heftigsten geführt. Als 1982 die
CDU-geführte Koalition an die Macht kam, war die Erwartung weit verbreitet, daß
Einfluß und Vorrechte der Betriebsräte (die noch kurz vor ihrem Ende von der
sozialliberalen Koalition beträchtlich ausgeweitet worden waren) nun deutlich
eingeschränkt werden würden. Doch es kam anders: Der einzige gesetzgeberische
Versuch von einiger Bedeutung gegen  das Regelwerk der Mitbestimmung wurde
durch zwei nicht „ins Herz“ der Mitbestimmung zielende Initiativen vorgetragen: die
Minderheitenrechte regelnden Bestimmungen zu den Betriebsratswahlen zu
verändern und als Vertretungsorgane für das Mittelmanagement sog.
Sprecherausschüsse einzuführen. Trotz großer Unterstützung von seiten der
Koalition wurden diese Vorschläge, obwohl vom Parlament bereits verabschiedet, im
Gesetzgebungsverfahren entscheidend abgeschwächt und hatten so im Endeffekt
fast keine Wirkung mehr.
In der vorliegenden Analyse wird die parlamentarische Behandlung der beiden
Vorschläge als Indikator für die prinzipiellere Frage gesehen, warum sich in der
Bundesrepublik in den achtziger Jahren der Neoliberalismus (und hier vor allem
dessen antigewerkschaftlicher Impetus) nur in so geringem Maße durchsetzen
konnte.
Als Ergebnis wird die weitverbreitete politikwissenschaftliche Argumentation
widerlegt, derzufolge durch den  Föderalismus eine zu radikalen Lösungen neigende
politische Kultur verhindert und stattdessen eine auf Konsens ausgerichtete
Politikgestaltung praktiziert wird. Vielmehr wird auf zwei Einflußmomente verwiesen,
die radikale Veränderungen verhindern:
Zum einen mußten in dem zur Sicherung der parlamentarischen Mehrheit
notwendigen, komplizierten Aushandlungsprozeß zwischen den Koalitionspartnern
bereits Kompromisse geschlossen werden, durch die das eigentliche Anliegen beider
Initiativen bereits erheblich verwässert wurde. Als bedeutsamer aber erwies sich -
und dies ist aus angelsächsischer Perspektive überaus überraschend -, daß die
deutschen Unternehmen gerade die Reformen ablehnten, die die konservativliberale
Regierung als in deren Interesse liegend begründet hatte. Diese ablehnende Haltung
ist nur zu verstehen, wenn die spezifischen Anreize und Beschränkungen genauer in
Betracht gezogen werden, denen sich die Arbeitgeber in einem koordinierten
Produktionsregime gegenübersehen.
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10. Introduction
The history of codetermination in Germany testifies both to the strength of the
class divide in the German industrial tradition, and to the ability of a political
system to institutionalise compromise.  Few issues have provoked as intense
and prolonged political tussles as that of control of the workplace.  Worker
participation in factories (in Arbeiterausschüsse) was brought in during the First
World War as a concession to unions in return for cooperation with the war
effort.  During the Weimar years, works councils were set up as subsidiary
bodies of the (reformist) trade unions, largely to isolate the radical Left within
the German labour movement.  Their independence and activities were,
however, quickly circumscribed by the intransigence of employers associations,
worsening economic conditions, disintegration of the national union movement,
and finally by the legislation of the National Socialists.1  In the years of Allied
occupation after the War, co-determination experienced a renaissance.  In
heavy industry in particular, company-level representation for workers
flourished, encouraged both by the weakness of German employers after the
removal or discrediting of powerful industrialists, and by the Allies’ view that
stronger workers’ representation would prevent a recurrence of the political
alliances that underpinned Nazism.
Codetermination in the Federal Republic was shaped by two laws of the
early 1950s.  The first, the Codetermination Act of 1951, represented a
significant victory for organised labour.2  The act applied exclusively to the coal
and steel industry (the Montan industries), and required an equal number of
representatives of a company’s workforce and stockholders on supervisory
boards of large companies (‘parity codetermination’).3  Despite the opposition of
German industry, the Act was passed by Adenauer’s Christian Democrat
government, with only the 50 FDP representatives voting against.  A year later,
however, the unions failed to force the government to extend these terms to
other industries.   The 1952 Works Constitution Act stipulated that only a third
of seats on supervisory boards of large (non-Montan) firms be reserved for
                                                          
1
  See Thelen (1991), pp. 63-71.  The comprehensive history of pre-World War One worker
participation is Teuteberg (1961).  On organised labour in the metalworking sector before
1945, a good overview can be found in Markovits (1986), pp. 179-83.
2
  The 1951 Act’s terms merely confirmed the situation that already existed in the western
sectors of occupied Germany, and which had been codified under the Allied Occupation in
1948 (Kontrollratsgesetz 22, article 75).
3
  A fuller explanation of the terms of this and the 1952 Works Constitution Act is provided in
Streeck (1992), pp. 138-46.  German companies have both a supervisory board and a
management board.  On the latter, workers were entitled only to a labour director, who could
not be appointed against a majority of the labour representatives on the supervisory board.
In the event of deadlock on supervisory boards, an additional member (almost always a
member of management) was called upon to break the tie.  These two caveats eliminated
the possibility that the Act could lead to a fundamental transfer of power within firms.
2workers’ representatives.  In addition, although the act made provision for the
establishment of works’ councils at the plant level, two important features of the
law limited the significance of this achievement.  First, the rights (consultative
and ‘codetermining’) works councils enjoyed were exactly specified, and,
compared to much practice under existing federal states’ laws, considerably
limited.4  Even more importantly, employers and Christian Democrats saw the
legal recognition of works councils as an opportunity to undermine the link
between German unions and workplace representation, and so to fragment the
institutions of organised labour.  Works councils had no formal link to German
unions, and were required by law to orient their activities to the interests of the
company.  Markovits goes so far as to suggest that “(t)he employers and their
parliamentary allies hoped to restrict - even eliminate - labor’s collective power
on the shop floor by replacing the presence of unions with that of factory-
minded, syndicalist and highly particularistic works councils.”5
Despite this intention, the trade unions within the national confederation
came to dominate works councils across industries and co-ordinate their
demands and activities.  Particularly important in this regard has been the
ability of unions through labour directors to control personnel recruitment, and
the full-time officials on supervisory boards who have maintained contact
between the national union and local representatives.  The position of trade
unions within companies was further reinforced by the findings of the
Biedenkopf Commission in 1970, set up by the Grand Coalition to investigate
the practice of codetermination in the Montan industries, with a view to its
extension.  Biedenkopf reported that codetermination on the supervisory boards
in coal and steel had resulted in compromise rather than antagonism between
labour and capital - between 1964 and 1968, the ‘neutral member’ had never
been called upon to exercise a casting vote in 72% of the companies
concerned.6  Furthermore, the inclusion of labour representatives had not
resulted in a relegation of the goals of profitability and productivity, though a
greater attention to manpower questions had been a resulting benefit.
When the Social Democrats emerged as the dominant coalition partner
in 1969, they set about planning legislation to extend codetermination.  The
1972 Works Constitution Act (BetrVG 1972) replaced the 1952 Act, and
expanded the rights and resources of works councils, as well as the legal
obstacles barring union officials from holding office in works councils.
However, while the SPD’s coalition partners, the liberal FDP, were prepared to
approve a strengthening of works councils, they strongly resisted, under
pressure from business, the extension of the Montan parity formula for
codetermination on supervisory boards to other industries.  Although a new
                                                          
4
  “The DGB executive board passed a resolution charging that the 1952 legislation not only
would annul the better regulations provided by existing state laws, in some ways it was not
even as favourable as the 1920 Works Council Law” (Thelen (1991), p.75).
5
 Markovits (1986), p.80-1.
6
  Mitbestimmungskommission (1970), p.143.
3Codetermination Act was eventually passed in 1976, it was “a compromise that
lay somewhere between the coal and steel model and the one-third formula of
the Works Constitution Act”.7  The Act may have disappointed the unions, but it
succeeded in angering employers associations sufficiently to provoke a
constitutional challenge to the law’s validity.  After three years of protracted
legal battle the Federal Constitutional Court declared the law constitutional in
1979, rejecting the argument that the combined effects of the 1972 and 1976
Acts constituted an equivalence of parity on supervisory boards.  Employers
continued to oppose the law, however, and used a variety of subtle strategies to
reduce the impact of the 1976 Law - e.g., by legal reclassification of enterprises
to reduce the total pool of companies covered.  When the Social Democrats fell
from power in 1982, the stage seemed set for a concerted assault on the forms
and scope of codetermination in German economic life.
As expected, the CDU-led administration, pressured by both their FDP
coalition partners and ‘neoliberal’ voices within the part itself, renewed the
battle over works councils.  But the battle of the 1980s was not about the formal
standing of works councils before the law, as it had been in the 1950s and
1970s.  Nor did it tackle head-on the sets of issues over which works councils
had codetermining powers.  Rather, the debate in the 1980s centred around
two separate initiatives pertaining to the de facto monopoly of power exercised
by the DGB - the main trade union confederation - within the works council
system.  The first of these was concerned with the protection of minority unions
(and non-unionised workers) on works councils, and particularly in elections to
these bodies; the second concerned the establishment of representative bodies
for ‘middle management’ distinct from those covering the conventional
workforce.  Taken together, these legislative moves amounted to an indirect but
highly significant assault on the institutional and strategic foundations of the
German trade union movement.  Yet the legislation that emerged from a
protracted four-year struggle over these proposals was of marginal
consequence to the position of the DGB, and has had little effect since its
enactment in January 1989.  This paper examines the process by which a
fundamental threat to one of the pillars of the German industrial relations
system dissipated almost entirely, and the reasons for this political retreat.
The argument put forward here rejects three hypotheses about the
sources of resistance to ‘neoliberal’ policy initiatives in the West German case.
The first suggests that neoliberalism was an Anglo-American phenomenon,
emerging from a tradition of limited government and suspicion of highly
organised social actors as ‘bearers’ of public power.  In contrast, the evidence
put forward here demonstrates a desire on the part of a significant portion of
the government coalition to use the principle of promoting democracy within
                                                          
7
  Streeck (1992), p.148.  A formal adoption of the parity model for other industries was diluted
by requirements that one of the delegation of labour representatives come from middle
management (leitende Angestellte), and that these representatives could not be appointed by
unions directly.
4and between unions as a way of undermining their collective unity.  Secondly,
the fact that the legal standing of workers and unions in Germany has not been
eroded is sometimes attributed to the extent of social protection enjoyed by
German labour.  The rights of workers are so entrenched that it has simply
been politically impossible to overcome the resistance of German unions.  In
the cases discussed here, however, the virulent opposition of German unions
played little role in hindering the advance of the desired reforms.  Rather, the
clues to the stuttering trajectory of reform lie in the fractures within the coalitions
that supported different parts of the final policy package, and with the groups
which were expected to, but in fact did not, support the proposals.  Thirdly, it is
commonly claimed that the Madisonian design of the German political system
frustrates attempts at significant reforms of whatever partisan variety.
Institutions with overlapping competencies providing multiple veto points, and
often constituted along consensual lines, generate too many opportunities for
too many potential opponents to allow anything controversial to make its way to
statute.  But this argument is true only in special circumstances and certain
cases.  The example of reform of workplace representation in the 1980s
illustrates precisely how little a German government can be constrained by the
formal powers of rival institutions, and how significantly by tensions within its
own coalition.
In place of these explanations, I argue in this paper that the attempt to
reform workplace representation was transformed by two sets of factors - firstly,
by the (perhaps surprising) preference of employers (in both large and small
firms, across sectors) and their representative associations, that the two
challenges to the representational monopoly of the DGB unions be rebuffed;
and secondly, by the modifications to various parts of the reform package that
were required as ‘side-payments’ to crucial political groups within the coalition
in order to secure their support.
The paper first addresses the background to the two proposals in turn,
and sketches the proposals put forward by the coalition government in 1984-5.
Unusually, the issues excited a united opposition from both the DGB and the
German employers’ associations, whose views are examined in section 3.  The
complex political dynamics within the coalition are then examined in section 4,
focusing in particular on the way in which the policy proposals were combined
and then repeatedly watered down in order to appease conflicting
constituencies within the coalition.
51. Challenging Einheitsgewerkschaft
1.1: Minority Rights in Works Councils (Minderheitenrechte)
According to Article 1 of the BetrVG 1972, works councils may be elected in
plants with five or more permanent employees.8  In fact, the incidence of works
councils is relatively low in small firms compared to medium- and large-sized
companies, perhaps because workers in small firms stand to suffer from
‘employer reprisals’ if, as the Act allows, they call for and establish a
representative body.  The Act limited the works council’s term to three years,
elected by a direct vote of all the plant’s permanent employees.  The
nomination of candidates is controlled by the various unions present in the
workplace, and occasions the most significant conflicts between German
unions in industrial life.
During the Second World War, the leaders of the exiled unions agreed to
reconstruct the German union movement using the principles of industrial and
non-sectarian organisation (the famous principle of Einheitsgewerkschaft).  The
result was the establishment between 1948 and 1950 of sixteen
Industriegewerkschaften (industrial unions), including both blue- and white-
collar workers, grouped at the national level into a politically independent
federation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB).  Soon after its founding,
however, the DGB’s monopoly of worker representation was challenged by
white-collar workers and civil servants, who demanded the reconstruction of the
social democratic unions of the Weimar Republic.  When the DGB refused to
co-operate with these groups, they independently established a German White
Collar Union (the DAG, Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft) and a German
Civil Servants Federation (the DBB, Deutscher Beamten Bund).  Three years
later, the DGB seemed to breech its commitment to partisan neutrality when its
leaders publicly supported the SPD during the 1953 electoral campaign.
Despite the intervention of Adenauer to prevent a split in the DGB, a small
group of breakaway unionists from the Christian Democratic wing of the DGB
split off to found the Christian Union Movement (the CGB, Christliche
Gewerkschaftsbewegung 9).
The numerical and political importance of these rival federations has
always been small, though within sectors they exercise considerable leverage.
The DAG accounts for about 20% of all white-collar workers in Germany, while
around 45-50% of all civil servants belong to the DBB.  The CGB, while
organised in a federated structure that shadows the DGB sector-by-sector, has
                                                          
8
  Works councils were not permitted in firms with fewer than five employees, in the civil service
(which has an independent system of employee representation), in religious organisations,
and in firms which are part of the media.
9
  In 1959 the CGB merged with the member of a former right-wing union to form the
Christlicher Gewerkschaftsbund.
6never had a total membership exceeding 350,000.  In consequence, the DGB
could claim over 83% of the total unionised workforce when the CDU-FDP-CSU
government came to power in 1982.10  The DGB has developed very close links
to the SPD since the early 1950s, and is therefore seen by many on the ‘right’
as a political enemy.  Indeed, the Bavarian CSU, with its own strong links to the
small CGB union movement, has on occasions intimated its support for a state-
sponsored promotion of the CGB as a way of weakening the DGB’s strong
position within the national labour movement.11
As noted above, the DGB has overcame the potentially divisive effects of
establishing workplace representative bodies by forging strong links between
works councils and the union structures.  This link is seen as a vital plank in the
maintenance of solidarity across industries, and in securing the DGB’s control
of coordinating workers’ representation in both the spheres of traditional
collective bargaining at the industry level and the various domains of qualitative
issues reserved to works councils by the BetrVG 1972.  Control of works
councils comes primarily through control of who gets elected to works councils,
and who gets nominated to sit on the important works council committees
(which in effect are the executive directors of works council affairs).  The DGB’s
ability to control these two processes - candidate selection and committee
appointments - has been secured by three factors.  First, the disproportionate
number of workers affiliated to DGB unions across all sectors has transferred
into a DGB dominance of work council positions.  Second, the relevant law
governing candidate selection to works councils (section 15 of the BetrVG
1972) stipulated that candidates (or lists of candidates slated by unions) had to
receive the signatures of one-tenth of the eligible workforce in order to be
nominated.  Given that no other federated union covered anywhere near 10%
of the total workforce, this had the effect of guaranteeing that non-DGB
affiliated unions would obtain limited representation on works councils in certain
sectors only, and thus exaggerated the degree of dominance enjoyed by the
DGB in the workforce.  In the coal-mining industry, for example, about 93% of
elected works councillors were members of the DGB-affiliated German Miners
Union (the IGBE, or Industriegewerkschaft für Bergbau und Energie).12
Third, a number of additional rules (of dubious legality) were widely
imposed by the works council election committees - run by DGB union
representatives - to reinforce their dominance.  Already in 1978 some examples
                                                          
10
  It is important to remember that well over half of the German workforce is non-unionised
(59.87% in 1981), so the DGB covers around one-third of the total West German workforce.
In the last four years, membership of DGB-affiliated unions has been declining slowly but
steadily - in 1995 the DGB covered just under 10 million workers out of a total workforce of
34.4 million (around 29%).  See “German unions confront meltdown”, The Independent on
Sunday, 28 April 1996.
11
  The most notable case was that of the Stoiber paper, an internal CSU document that
discussed possible strategies for countering the growing radicalism within the DGB.  See
Deppe et. al. (1978)
12
  On the links between unions and codetermination see Streeck (1981), pp. 236 ff.
7of ballot-rigging had been exposed 13, but during the 1984 elections these and
other practices received considerable press attention and criticism, no doubt in
large measure because of the political tensions produced by the metalworkers’
dispute over reduced working time.  A catalogue of complaints about undue
DGB influence on the conduct of elections and inadequate publicity were
received concerning the Mannesmann iron and steel plant in Duisburg-
Huekingen.  In a number of sectors, the DGB-union was accused of
discouraging workers from supporting non-DGB candidates - in some cases by
forbidding workers signing nominations for more than one candidate; in others
by preparing forms for workers to sign withdrawing their signatures from
nominations of non-DGB candidates; in still others by informal pressure from
plant officials on individual workers not to sign.14  The appointment of
committee representatives by works councils was also subject to manipulation.
DGB majorities on the councils commonly distributed the important committee
chairs and sabbatical positions (Freistellungen) exclusively to DGB-union
representatives.  As a result, works councils with 51% DGB composition could
and did appoint committees run solely by their own union.  At Kugelfischer’s
plant in Schweinfurt, for example, works council elections in 1984 gave IG
Metall 18 of 33 works councils seats, 10 to the CGB and five to the DAG.  All of
the important sabbatical posts, however, were allocated by the DGB-majority
led council to DGB members.15
Critics of the DGB, however, pointed to signs of weakening support for
their member unions in the 1984 election results.  In the elections for central
works council positions in Siemens AG, for example, under 30% of the seats
were won by IG Metall representatives, and over 60% in total by candidates
with no union affiliation at all.  Overall, 1984 saw the share of works council
places going to non-unionised representatives exceed 25% for the first time
(see Appendix 1 for historical data on the results of works council elections in
the FRG).  Some commentators speculated that the fate of the DGB unions
might parallel that of the social democratic political movement to which it had
tied itself so closely in the preceding decade. 16 Protection of the rights of the
so-called minority unions had been promoted by the CSU (and to a lesser
extent by the FDP) for some time, but the advent of a new Christian-Liberal
coalition coupled with evidence of corruption in the wake of the metalworkers’
strike served to re-ignite the issue in 1984.  The inevitability of legislative action
was finally confirmed by the constitutional court’s confirmation of a previous
ruling in November 1984 that the 10% threshold requirement of signatures for
candidacy was unconstitutional, as it generated a de facto DGB monopoly in
                                                          
13
  In a Daimler-Benz plant in Stuttgart, the courts ordered fresh elections after fake ballot
papers were uncovered, while at Lufthansa in Frankfurt a union official was dismissed having
taken the election urn home for an evening!
14
  See examples in von Tiesenhausen (1984).
15
  Der Spiegel (1984).
16
  See von Tiesenhausen (1984).
8works councils in contravention of Article 3 of the Grundgesetz.17  Partisan
support for legislation lowering the signature threshold was thus from late 1984
supported by the imperative of constitutional necessity.
1.2: Representation for middle management (Sprecherausschüsse für Leitende
Angestellte)
The battle over codetermination was premised on a view of a dominant
cleavage in economic life between workers and owners.  In many industries,
however, a stratum of middle managers - employees with significant executive
powers (including hiring and firing) but subordinate to higher authorities within
the firm - escaped these straightforward classificatory categories.  As early as
1971 the FDP in its Freiburger Theses had raised the demand for middle
management committees (Sprecherausschüsse), and in the same year the
CDU introduced a bill to the Bundestag along the same lines.  The ‘pro-market’
FDP has consistently supported the introduction of these committees on the
grounds of fairness to all groups within the company.  Politically, however, the
advantage of the proposal lies in the possibility for setting up a rival
representative body to the works council, thus undermining worker solidarity
and weakening the constraints on managerial autonomy.   The FDP resurrected
the issue during the 1980 election, and shortly before the formation of the new
coalition in October 1982 a prominent CDU Bundestag member, Wolfgang
Vogt, indicated his party’s support for new legislation in the near future.
One of the main arguments used in favour of such committees was an
inconsistency in the social democrats’ legislation of the 1970s.  The 1976
Codetermination Act made provision for representatives of middle management
to sit on firm supervisory boards and central company works councils - the 1972
Act, however, had not recognised this group at the plant level works councils at
all.  Nevertheless, Sprecherausschüsse were set up on a voluntary basis in
about 400 firms before legislation compelling their establishment was prepared
in the mid-1980s.  Employers in these firms claimed that they had been very
successful (though they resisted giving the committees a legal basis).  The
representative association of leitende Angestellte, the ULA, was unsurprisingly
a vociferous proponent of a mandatory committee system.  Jürgen Borgwardt,
their head, argued that the existing works council system could not legitimately
encompass middle management, as the interests, social standing and tasks of
the two groups were simply too different.  The ULA saw a Christian-Liberal
coalition as offering an unmissable opportunity to legislate on
Sprecherausschüsse, one which the opposition of the DGB and SPD had
successfully suppressed for nearly 15 years.18  For their part, the DGB quite
                                                          
17
  The ruling was regarding a passage in the Bundespersonalgesetz concerning employees in
the public sector, but as the passage was identical to that in the BetrVG 1972, the need for
amendment was extended to the latter.  For details on the ruling, see Die Zeit (1984).
18
  See “ULA: Schutz vor einer Majorisierung”, Handelsblatt (3 October 1985).
9clearly interpreted Sprecherausschüsse as threats to their de facto monopoly
over German workers, precisely the result that attracted the proposal to the
FDP and CDU Wirtschaftsflügel (business wing).  While conceding the distinct
contractual position of middle management, DGB spokesmen were at pains to
point out that in no way could leitende Angestellte be understood as a “third
force” (dritte Macht) in German industrial relations, and therefore that the
existing apparatus of worker representation was perfectly adequate to
accommodate their grievances.
Each of the two proposals affecting works councils had its own
constituency of political supporters within the governing coalition.  The
protection of minority groups within works councils was promoted primarily by
the CSU as a means of improving the position of the Christian trade unions 19;
while advocating distinct factory representation for middle management had
been the political hobby-horse of the FDP for a number of years prior to 1982.
The pro-business wing of the CDU, meanwhile, was generally supportive of
both initiatives.  The same could not be said of Chancellor Kohl and Norbert
Blüm, the Labour Minister.  In the wake of the damaging metalworkers strike in
1984, Blüm and Kohl were anxious to avoid any showdowns with the unions.
This imperative of conflict avoidance was heightened by the bitter struggle over
the reform of the strike payments law that gained momentum between 1984
and 1986.  It is a testament to the strong bargaining positions inside the
coalition enjoyed by the two smaller parties that a reticent political elite within
the CDU were forced to acknowledge the pressures for legislative reform, and
risk further antagonism between the social partners and the government.
Though the initiatives were sponsored by different groups within the
coalition, the motivations that inspired them were linked in three important
ways.  Firstly, they were both prompted by a perception of radicalism within the
DGB movement during and after the 1984 strike.  In both cases, a motivating
ideal for the supporters of reform was that the DGB’s militancy had increased
notably, and that such radicalism had its structural roots in an organisational
monopoly over workers.  Strengthening rival groups and rival institutions to
those dominated by the DGB was therefore an attempt in part to engender
moderation by encouraging competition between forms of worker
representation.  Secondly, both initiatives were motivated to some degree by
the desire to weaken the position of labour in the workplace.  The (largely
intended) effect of setting up Sprecherausschüsse as well as of improving the
position of minority unions within works’ councils was seen to be to weaken the
ability of the DGB to speak with one voice, and so indirectly to increase the
bargaining strength of management.  Thirdly, and most significantly, these
intentions constituted a flagrant challenge to the principle of
Einheitsgewerkschaft that had been the foundation of the DGB’s de facto
                                                          
19
  The idea for the initiative was attributed to Franz-Josef Strauss and Edmund Stoiber of the
CSU, and was an important part of Strauss’ campaigns in the Bayern regional elections.  The
CSU’s most prominent Bundestag advocate of ‘minority rights’ in works councils was Peter
Keller.
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monopoly of the German workforce.  Both proposals aimed at splintering
worker representation, while the proposal to strengthen minority unions’ rights
also aimed at injecting partisan-tinged competition between unions.  The
importance of Einheitsgewerkschaft to the architecture of German industrial
relations can hardly be exaggerated.  The dominance of DGB-affiliated unions
has been a cornerstone of the ability of the social partners to coordinate wages
and other supply-side variables within and across industries.  Threats to the
organisational monopoly of the DGB therefore can without excessive drama be
interpreted as attacks on the characteristic mode of economic governance in
(West) Germany.20
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  Familiar and influential characterisations of German political economy which agree on this
pivotal characteristic are: Katzenstein (1987); Soskice (1991); Streeck (1992).
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2. The Opposition of the Social Partners
From the announcement by the coalition in November 1984 that legislation was
to be introduced to amend the BetrVG 1972 the German unions went onto the
offensive.  Hans Mayr, head of IG Metall, warned the coalition against
“weakening the unions through policies of division and by reinforcing the
position of industrialists under the pretext of protecting minorities”.  His
colleague, Horst Klaus, made the point more clearly - the proposal was “a
declaration of war on the unions”, and clearly “part of a comprehensive anti-
union strategy”.21  In the eyes of the unions, the proposal to strengthen minority
unions was an attempt to weaken the DGB using a spurious justification of
promoting internal democracy.  Some union heads warned that increasing the
prominence of rival groups in works councils would simply increase the
leverage of radical elements 22; others saw the initiative as a way of
strengthening “yellow unions”, i.e. unions closer to the interests of employers.
Literature produced by IG Metall saw the idea of a middle management
committee as “a sort of upper house for the firm’s nobility”.23 The SPD quickly
rallied to the support of their union allies - Jürgen Egert, regional chair of the
SPD, referred to the two bills as part of a “divide and rule” strategy.  As with the
case of reform of strike payments, the DGB organised a nation-wide campaign
of resistance, centring on days of industrial action and pressure on sympathetic
Bundestag representatives on the ‘left’ of the CDU.
More surprising, however, was the opposition by West German employer
associations to the proposals.  The reasons for this opposition are worth
examining in some detail.  From early in the debates over possible reforms to
the Works Constitution Act, employer groups made it clear that they preferred
the government to keep its hand out of industrial relations within the firm.
Intervention of any sort, it was argued, brought with it the likelihood of unrest, of
disturbances to the order of collective bargaining within firms and within plants.
German employers and their associations had resisted the extension of works
councils and their powers throughout the 1970s, but in the 1980s were reluctant
to support legislation to roll back these powers.  How can we understand this
seeming contradiction?
The answer points to the need to understand the consequences of the
coordination of capital for the policy preferences that employers hold.  German
business has been able, through a variety of formal and informal organisational
innovations, to sustain coordinated solutions to certain important collective
action problems involved in industrial production.  The ability to resolve these
                                                          
21
  Die Zeit (1984).
22
  Döding and Keller (heads respectively of the food and restaurant industry union, and the
textiles and clothing union) were outspoken critics of the initiative on these grounds.
23
  Horst Klaus, IG Metall board member, press conference, 25 August 1988.
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problems has formed the foundation of German industry’s success in
manufacturing high quality exports.  Yet an important component of this
organisational recipe for flexible, high value-added production is the compliance
of organised labour itself.  The maintenance, for example, of a skilled workforce
which can respond flexibly to new technology requires compliance by the
unions in alternative forms of work organisation, and a commitment to costly
and time-consuming skilling and re-skilling programmes throughout a lifetime of
work.  On the other hand, wage control within sectors is effected by a high
degree of regulation through systematised wage bargaining at the industrial
level.  The stability of this system relies on unions’ continued consent to
sectoral bargaining, and to the conventions that transmit ‘landmark’ wage deals
from one region or sector to another.
This logic has strong implications for the preferences of employers over
the forms of union representation.  First and foremost, a system based on
organised bargaining requires that the parties to the bargain can deliver the
support of those whom they claim to represent.  Second, the bargain should
have maximal coverage of like cases if it is to serve as a common framework
for all firms within a sector.  With regard to collective bargaining these goals
have been served by the dual operation of law and convention - by law in that
wage increases, once negotiated between the employer associations and
unions, can be declared as binding on all workers within a sector irrespective of
their membership in a union (Allgemeinverbindlichkeitserklärung); by
convention in the sense that wage deals negotiated within a lead region serve
as the blueprint for other regional bargains within a sector.  Similar logic applies
in the case of bargaining at the company and plant level.  Given the fact that
bargaining with the plant workforce is required by law over certain issues, it is
rational for employers to ensure that the internal discipline of the works council
delegation is as strong as possible - i.e. to ensure that the works council
“speaks with one voice”.  Employers therefore have an interest in preventing
divisions between unions within the workplace, both because it complicates the
process of bargaining and consultation, and because fragmentation of worker
representation brings with it the possibility of politicisation of works councils.
This last point is important - employers have an incentive to cooperate with
works councils to the extent that these bodies unite employee interests, and
facilitate employee concern and responsibility for the welfare of the firm as a
whole.  In contrast, they have a strong interest in rejecting cooperation with
works councils if the councils become the vehicles for political competition
between unions.  Under these circumstances, unions may see fit to ‘bid’ for
workers’ support by pursuing intransigent bargaining strategies, leading to
escalating friction between management and workers.  Thus, the nature of
employers’ support for works councils is in theory contingent on the permissible
forms of worker representation within the councils themselves.
Employers’ preferences regarding works councils are therefore usefully
depicted as a series of nested strategies.  Given a preference from a tabula
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rasa, employers would almost certainly prefer that works councils were not
statutorily required (though they may see the virtues in voluntary establishment
in certain circumstances).  Once created and invested with powers, however,
employers face a choice: they can either press for the restriction of their powers
(or their abolition), or they can support their continued existence.  The choice of
opposition will undoubtedly provoke a conflict with the unions, and the option
therefore depends on a range of supplementary political considerations (such
as the sympathies of the ruling government).  In an economy, however, in
which production strategies largely depend upon maintaining high-quality, high
skill goods, flexible patterns of work organisation and a readiness to integrate
new technology into manufacturing processes, the cooperation of organised
labour is too important to risk severe and protracted industrial conflict.24
Furthermore, works councils offer the possibility of being usefully utilised by
employers to further strengthen progressive coordination between management
and workers.  In particular, works councils can be co-opted into firm regimes
governing ‘internal labour markets’ that facilitate the recruitment and retention
of skilled labour.
Employers in West Germany, therefore, could come to terms with the
existence of these councils if they could be organised in forms that were
conducive to these goals.  Once works councils were accepted by employers as
a permanent feature of industrial relations - an acceptance which can be dated
to the loss of the appeal to the Constitutional Court in 1979 - their primary
interest became one of ensuring that the character of works councils did not
depart from this paradigm.  Perhaps paradoxically, therefore, employers
associations saw their interests lying in a rejection of the specific reform
proposals of the CDU-led administration to weaken the DGB’s monopoly on
works council politics.
The public declarations of employers from early on in the dispute confirm
this theoretical interpretation. An article on the dispute in Die Zeit observed
shortly after the proposals were announced the curious lack of employer
support for the reforms.  The reason, it was argued, was that: “Businessmen
are worried about industrial peace.  What they would like most of all is not to
disturb the Works Constitution Act, as each amendment threatens to bring
unrest”.25  Employers clearly rejected the idea that they saw the Christian-
Liberal government as an opportunity to further a “divide and rule” strategy in
the workplace.  Instead, “most employers ... would prefer companies and works
councils with as unified a representation of interests as possible”.  The initiative
to strengthen minority unions by lowering the threshold for signatures to
candidate lists raised the likelihood of radical groups finding their way into
works councils.  As the employers association in the chemicals industry put it,
the proposals raised the spectre of a “permanent electoral war” within works
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   I am indebted to Bob Hancké for the development of this point.
25
  Die Zeit (1984).
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councils.26  A similar argument was used to reject the suggestion of introducing
a proportional representation principle into the allocation of works council
committee chairs and sabbatical posts - the move “could only, as the unions
also argue, strengthen the competition for interest representation in the works
council, generate power struggles, expand the opportunities for radical groups,
and significantly impede the work of the works council.”27  One of the ways in
which the proposal suggested that minority unions could be strengthened was
to vest them with a general right to propose a slate of candidates.  As the
employer associations pointed out, however, this merely strengthened the
individual unions’ ability to compete with each other.  Opposition to the middle
management committees was equally strong.  The great fear for the employers’
associations was that these committees would compete with the Betriebsrat for
access to the ear of management, and that agreements between employers
and workers would be made more problematic by the necessity of conducting
separate bargains.28  The most satisfactory compromise, it was widely
suggested by employers, would be to retain the possibility of setting up
Sprecherausschüsse on a voluntary basis where desired.29
                                                          
26
  Bundesarbeitgeberverband Chemie e.V Informationsbrief, discussed in Handelsblatt (1985b).
27
  From Frankfurter Allgemeine (1985).
28
  A spokesman from a large company in Hessen commented to the taz (Tageszeitung)
newspaper that the Sprecherausschuss in his company had been devoted to “making sure
that the firm is at the disposal of middle management”, and to maintaining symbols of their
status differential, such as the privilege of holidays from employment for health treatments
(Kuraufenthalte).  See taz (1988).
29
  One of the most outspoken of German employers on these issues was Hans Schlitzberger,
board member of Siemens AG.
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3. Coalitions within the coalition:  the faltering path of reform
Employer opposition was to prove crucial to the repudiation of the more
ambitious strands of the reform package after 1985.  Equally crucial, however,
was the political dynamic involved in assembling the requisite coalition within
the governing Bundestag majority for the proposals.  The case is an excellent
illustration of the limitations of coalition government on radical ambitions.  In
order to stitch together a majority for the two initial measures (regarding
Minderheitenrechte and Sprecherausschüsse), the CDU-led administration was
forced into a series of linkages, concessions and sweeteners that proved
unsustainable.  The eventual price for the passage of legislation was the
subtraction of most of the neoliberal bite from the initial proposals.
As noted earlier, the ‘minority union’ proposal was propelled by two
separate events - firstly, by the need for legislation after the Constitutional Court
had invalidated the existing provision (the 10% rule); and secondly by the
CSU’s concern both to water down the radicalism of the DGB after the 1984
strike, and to boost the position of the Christian trade unions (CGB) after their
disastrous showing in the 1984 works council elections (see appendix 1).
Under pressure from the CSU, the coalition announced its proposed reform on
8 November 1984 after deliberation by a CDU-CSU Fraktion committee under
Heimo George.  Initially, the intention was to replace the requirement for 10% of
the worker electorate to sign a proposal of candidacy with a nominal stipulation
that candidates receive only two signatures from unions, or from “groups”,
within the plant.  Secondly, each union represented on the Betriebsrat would
have the right to send a non-voting member onto the electoral committee of the
works council to ensure fair play.  Thirdly, works council committee positions
should be allocated in strict proportional representation to their shares of works
council votes.  These proposals were clearly designed to strengthen the
position of smaller unions vis-à-vis the DGB unions, but were also deliberately
hostile to independent or non-unionised Betriebsrat members despite their
success in the recent wave of elections.30  The CSU enjoyed support for these
proposals within the CDU from both its business wing (Wirtschaftsflügel) and, to
a lesser extent, from the Social Committees (CDA) with their strong links to the
Catholic workers’ union movement.  Nevertheless, the CDU’s leadership was
extremely wary of taking up the cause of minority groups against the DGB
unions so soon after the 1984 dispute.  In addition it was clear even at this
stage to figures such as Scharrenbroich, the CDA’s head officer, that the
unions would demand concessions on increased codetermination rights as the
price for legal strengthening of minority unions. 31
                                                          
30
  The non-unionised vote in the elections had reached 25% in 1984 for the first time (in 1975
the equivalent vote had been 17.5%).  See Appendix 1.
31
  Frankfurter Rundschau (1984).  Scharrenbroich’s comments, given his sympathies towards
the union movement, could be seen either as a threat or as a prediction.
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The CDA was however blatantly hostile to the second proposal, to
establish legally required committees representing middle management
alongside the existing works councils.  The FDP were aware that the proposal
enjoyed little support within the coalition outside the anti-union wing of the CDU
(i.e. elements of the Mittelstandsvereiningung and business wing).
Nevertheless, the pledge to introduce Sprecherausschüsse was a long-
standing one, and as the junior coalition partner the FDP was in a strong
position to force the CDU’s hand on issues of such political integrity.  Faced
with these two proposals from within the coalition, neither of which commanded
sufficient cross-coalitional backing to survive legislative passage in their own
right, the CDU Bundestag Fraktion leader, Alfred Dregger, decided to combine
the issues into one package.  There was some objective logic to this decision -
both measures were about worker representation, and affected the same
pieces of legislation.32  But the decision to combine the issues was motivated
more by the necessity to engineer a political deal that could allow both
proposals to succeed in the Bundestag.  The deal established an explicit quid
pro quo between the FDP and the coalition groups sympathetic to the Christian
Unions - each was required to support the other’s initiative in order to see their
own succeed.  Yet the twinning of the two issues, which was required in order
to secure internal support for the reforms within the coalition, strengthened the
impression that the coalition was supporting a comprehensive attack on the
German union movement.  Dregger’s announcement therefore not only
galvanised political opposition from the SPD and DGB, but equally importantly
thereby exacerbated the reluctance of the CDU-leadership to support the
proposals.  At a meeting of the FDP and CDU Fraktionen at the end of
November 1984, Helmut Kohl urged the parties to shelve both proposals for the
time being.  Norbert Blüm, the CDU Labour Minister, expressed similar
reservations, commenting in December that the proposals would be the most
difficult problem confronting him in the upcoming year.33
Combining the issues also put the CDA in an awkward position.  While
many of its members had some sympathy with the attempt to strengthen the
CGB unions, it was unthinkable that the Social Committees could support
measures that were interpreted as weakening the union movement as a whole.
One of the most important consequences of the legislative coupling of the
Minderheitenschutz and Sprecherausschüsse issues, therefore, was to commit
the CDA to seek compensatory side-payments to the unions in exchange for
accepting the bills.  From November 1984, a CDA commission under Müller’s
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  Dregger defended his decision in precisely these terms: “Of course we know that there is
opposition from sections of the unions.  But I cannot accept this opposition.  Because
protection of minority unions concerns a democratic principle.  The representation of middle
management - a group not represented in the works council - concerns giving these groups
their own voice as well.  That is a democratic principle.  I cannot ignore democratic principles
just because unions or whoever else regard the setting up of middle management
committees or protection of minority unions as undesirable” (Handelsblatt (1984)).
33
  Der Spiegel (1984).  Blüm’s links with the CDA made it even more difficult to be seen to
support an ‘anti-union’ measure.
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chairmanship devoted itself to investigating the possibility of extending
codetermination rights to cover the introduction of new technology.  This
initiative coincided with publication of the DGB’s “Action Program” in November
1984, the culmination of a four-year inquiry into the threat posed by new
technology to workers’ interests.  The program recommended a new strategy of
encouraging works councils to coordinate union technology policy goals, and to
construct a viable alternative to the plans of employers to use new technology
as a means of reducing employment: “Concrete alternatives to employers’
rationalisation plans ... must be developed and ‘carried’ politically by works
councils, shop steward committees, and the affected workers.”34
There thus soon emerged a political alliance over the issues between the
DGB and the Social Committees.  In public the German unions continued
vehemently to reject the proposals - IG Metall Board member Horst Klaus
accused the coalition of “wanting to introduce the bacteria of minorities into
Betriebsräte”, while Ernst Breit, head of the DGB, threatened to break off all
discussion with the government if they pushed ahead with the reforms.  In
private, however, the unions supported the efforts of the CDA within the
coalition to promote the agenda of extending codetermination in return for
conceding the reforms desired by the factions within the coalition.  The issues
of minority union protection and middle management committees were thus
linked inextricably with the agenda of expanding works council rights over the
introduction of new technology.  Unsurprisingly, this development further
exacerbated the opposition of employers to the whole reform package - the
extension of works council powers coupled with the further fragmentation of
worker representation presented a doubly unattractive prospect.35  The FDP
found itself in a more ambiguous position.  Their proposal to establish
Sprecherausschüsse was now bound to two further issues, one of which
excited indifference, the other of which (extending Mitbestimmung) generated
deep hostility.  The efforts to shore up support for the reforms were thus
successful only in disrupting and dividing the very groups whose assent was
needed.
As a result the construction of a viable reform package quickly became
subject to a “lowest common denominator” effect.  It was easy for groups to
obstruct the original intentions of the various proponents as a price for
continued support of the reform as a whole.  In the case of the
Minderheitenschutz reform supported primarily by the CSU, the first concession
concerned the percentage of signatures required for the nomination of
candidates.  As noted earlier, the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 1984 had
required that the number of signatures required to support a candidate’s
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  IG Metall (1984), p.9.  See also IG Metall’s industrial survey on the introduction of new
technology (IG Metall (1983)).
35
  Otto Esser, President of the BDA, expressed these and other reservations forcefully at a one-
day conference of trade unionists from the textile industry in Konstanz on 26 June 1985.
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nomination for election be lowered from the existing threshold of 10% of the
Betriebsrat electorate.  Strauss and his CSU colleagues clearly wanted a 3%
hurdle in its place, as the CGB unions whom they supported could claim in total
about 3% of the German workforce as members.36  Initially the coalition’s bill of
March 1985 supported this threshold.  But the CDU-CSU Bundestag working
group under Müller rejected this suggestion in favour of a 5% hurdle, and sided
with the employers contention that a lower threshold would succeed only in
opening the doors of works councils to disruptive radicals.37  To mollify the
CSU, a compromise solution was proposed according to which ‘recognised
unions’ within the firm would possess a right to nominate union-backed
candidates subject only to the submission of two supporting signatures.  While
the employers agreed to this suggestion with great reluctance, they were more
intransigent on the more important question of allocating committee chairs and
sabbaticals on the basis of strict proportional representation between union
groups.  Little headway was made in constructing a viable compromise on this
issue before October 1985.
Similar tensions plagued the FDP’s proposals to ground middle
management committees.  In the form advocated by groups such as the
Verband angesteller Akademiker und leitender Angestellten der chemischen
Industrie (VAA), the proposed middle management committees would enjoy a
number of rights ‘paralleling’ those of the Betriebsräte, primarily concerning
consultation over economic and business plans affecting middle management’s
interests.  More controversially, however, the proposal foresaw that
management and Sprecherausschüsse could negotiate ‘guideline agreements’
(Richtlinien) separate from the agreements covering the rest of the workforce.
In the eyes of employers and unionists alike, this suggestion ran counter to the
VAA and ULA’s claim that the Sprecherausschüsse in no way threatened or
curtailed the powers of existing bodies of worker representation.38 Two areas of
particular controversy thus emerged from the intra-coalition negotiations in the
first half of 1985.  First, the definition of precisely who the leitende Angestellte
                                                          
36
  The 3% hurdle suggestion was thus termed the “Lex CGB”, and was a response to the
atrocious performance of the CGB unions in the 1984 election round.  Between 1981 and
1984 their share of Betriebsrat seats dropped from 3.7% to 0.8%.  These seats were lost
predominantly to independent (nicht organisiert) candidates.  See the data in Appendix 1.
37
  One academic commentator backed up this point about the dangers of radicalism with an
anecdote from Weimar Germany: “In the Weimar period, works council candidate lists
needed only three signatures.... This requirement was extremely easy to fulfil.  It offered
radicals a great opportunity, one which was recognised straight away and exploited capably.
As a result the unholy alliance of Joseph Goebbels and Walter Ulbricht was able to establish
itself in works councils; works councils fell under the control of the leaders of the SA and
Communist Front.”  (from Herschel 1985)
38
  For the views of these pressure groups, see Handelsblatt 1985a, 1985c.  The Federal Labour
Court had hitherto contended that existing legislation gave the Betriebsrat a duty to cater to
the interests of so-called “third parties”, such as leitende Angestellte (middle managements).
Middle management groups argued that the distinctive tasks and tenure position of leitende
Angestellte required separate legal recognition (individually and as a collective entity within
the firm).
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were was seen by employers and the CDA as a central question.  Their strategy
was to push for a definition with multiple criteria so as to reduce the total
number of workers who would qualify as leitende Angestellte and thus minimise
the significance of their representation independent of conventional works
councils.  Secondly, there was a fierce battle over the scope of rights and
powers to be enjoyed by Sprecherausschüsse.  Employers were prepared to
accept that the committees should be able to make agreements concerning the
specific terms of employment of those ‘workers’ whom they represented
(particularly if the coverage could be a limited one).  But the nightmare scenario
was a law that required employers to make two separate agreements - one with
works councils, the other with Sprecherausschüsse - over general issues of
worker welfare, firm restructuring, etc.  Under these circumstances,
disagreement between the two bodies of worker representation would pose an
additional obstruction to those already implied by the need to reach an
agreement with the workforce as a whole.  Resistance of the BDA to this more
expansive role of Sprecherausschüsse provoked public fissures in the
governing coalition in June 1985, particularly after the details of the bill were
announced by the FDP.
By the summer of 1985, therefore, the momentum for reform had nearly
collapsed.  The FDP were unhappy with the resistance to their proposals, and
were reluctant to support the broad package of reforms if the terms involved
watering down the status of Sprecherausschüsse.  The CSU meanwhile found
support for the “Lex CGB” hard to come by anywhere.  And on both issues, an
alliance between the pro-business Wirtschaftsflügel and the Social Committees
(CDA) of the CDU proved to be the crucial obstacle to change.  The resulting
stalemate was, however, precisely what the CDU leadership (in particular,
Helmut Kohl and Norbert Blüm) desired.  Preoccupied with other more pressing
issues - the fallout over the strike payments law reform, and retrenchment of
welfare payments - Kohl was keen to dampen the demands for an unnecessary
reform which could only exacerbate existing tensions.  He was thus perfectly
ready to see progress on the bills halted by the intransigence of groups within
the coalition.  In July Kohl publicly distanced himself from the reforms, referring
to them as the business of the Fraktionen in the Bundestag and not his
concern.  Norbert Blüm backed the quid pro quo of concessions over expansion
of codetermination rights in the introduction of new technology in return for
approval of the proposed reforms.  In backing this proposal, Blüm was clearly
hoping that this ‘overloading’ of the reforms, while pleasing the CDA and trade
unions alike, would effectively kill the reform altogether.
When the Müller commission presented its recommendations on this
issue in August 1985, the reaction of employers associations was one of
dismay.  Müller not only recommended that Betriebsräte be involved in the
planning stages of all decisions to change the company’s production
technology, but most controversially that works councils should be entitled to
codetermining rights when management decisions lead to results that
“contradict the results of manpower science”.  In other words, the broadening of
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codetermination was envisaged as a punishment for managers’ failure to
pursue strategies recommended by the conclusions of academic inquiry.
Employers resistance to the reforms was unsurprisingly strengthened by
Müller’s proposals.  The issue finally brought the reform process to a halt.  On 5
September the government asked the CDU and FDP Fraktionen to approve
expanded Mitbestimmung proposals to add to the suggested amendments to
the Works Constitution Act.  The Fraktionen however refused, insisting that
works councils should at the most be given additional advisory rather than
codetermination rights.  With CDA backing, however, the Müller commission
returned in October with proposals for extending codetermination, much to the
delight of German trade unions.  Having reached a clear impasse, and with a
fierce battle over strike payments reform looming, the CDU government
decided to shelve the proposals indefinitely.
The proposals were resuscitated in April 1986 after considerable
pressure from the CSU and FDP.  In the year before the election, the CDU was
clearly pressed to demonstrate the pay-off to its governing partners of a
continuing commitment to the coalition.  But the tensions between the
proposals remained as strong as before.  There was a clear split within the
government over the wisdom of expanding Mitbestimmung as a sweetener to
the CDA and trade unions.  Yet without this sweetener, proceeding with the
reforms to the Works Constitution Act would incite a repeat of the political war
with the trade unions over paragraph 116, and seriously endanger the CDU-led
coalition’s electoral chances.  Primarily in order to stall further, the CDU-
controlled Bundestag ‘Labour’ committee set up a day of expert hearings on
April 23.  Only a week before the hearings, however, senior CDU officials
seemed to indicate that the proposals had been dropped again.  Albrecht, the
CDU President of Niedersachsen, who faced an important regional election in
May, was reported to have told leading DGB officials that no amendments of
the Works Constitution Act would be attempted before the next general
election; while Matthias Wissman, a business affairs spokesman in the CDU
Bundestag Fraktion, said that the reforms were no longer feasible because they
attempted to legislate too many incompatible proposals.  Wissman was
articulating what had been clear for over a year - within a month of the expert
hearings in Bonn, the government announced that the reforms were to be
postponed for the second time.  FDP leaders were furious, and accused the
CDU of attempting to placate union objections as a pre-election tactic.
Whatever the objections of the FDP, both parties were totally dependent
on maintaining an alliance with the CDU if they were to exert any influence at
the national level.  After the 1987 election, the coalition’s legislative majority
was strengthened, and the reforms were once more returned to the bargaining
table by the two smaller parties.  This time, however, a further issue became
entangled with those of protecting minority unions in works councils
(Minderheitenschutz), grounding middle management committees
(Sprecherausschüsse), and expanding codetermination rights over introducing
new technology.  The extension of the special terms governing codetermination
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in the Montan industries (coal and steel) was due to expire at the end of 1988.
While some elements within the FDP wanted the ‘parity’ Montan
codetermination formula to be rescinded, there was little serious contemplation
that the terms would not be renewed.39  CDU Fraktion heads decided to
introduce all four proposals affecting the “works constitution” in one package
(the Montan-paket), and were determined to rid their hands of the reforms once
and for all.  Once again, there was logic to the decision to combine the issues -
not only did they pertain to the same economic realm and legislation, but both
the renewal of Montan terms and amending the electoral rights of minority
unions were required (the first by the expiration of previous legislation, the
second by the constitutonal court).  Part of the motivation of the Kohl
government was the hope that the force of necessity would help overcome the
continuing divisions within the coalition.
Appendix 2 sets out the configuration of support and opposition for the
four elements of the Montan-Paket in May 1988.  Each of the four key actors
within the coalition who had strong preferences concerning the content of the
reforms was in a dual position - all actors were strong backers and strong
opponents of at least one of the four proposals.  The CDU leadership, in a
series of consultations with their coalition partners and with the Social
Committees of their own party, faced two strategic options, which can be
labelled a ‘high-content’ and ‘low-content’ compromise.  A high-content
compromise would have consisted of an agreement that all proposals be
combined into one package.  In the event, however, each group cared more
about blocking the proposals of its “partners” than pushing through the
strongest version of its own.  Thus, the FDP Fraktion was prepared to concede
ground on the issue of  Sprecherausschüsse (particularly their constituents and
powers) in return for maintaining the autonomy of managers by vetoing the
stronger version of the plan to expand Mitbestimmung.  The CDA, meanwhile,
allowed the codetermination provisions over new technology to be restricted in
return for concessions by the FDP over Sprecherausschüsse and by the CSU
over allocation of works council committee positions using the Proporzprinzip
(proportional representation).
As a result of this complex web of concessions, each of the three main
proposals eventually passed through the Bundestag - on 1 December 1988 - in
                                                          
39
  In the early 1950s codetermination in the Montan industries was established by two pieces of
legislation (see above).  The special status of the industry remained intact in the subsequent
30 years, but industrial restructuring form the mid-1970s onwards complicated the
distinctions between Montan and non-Montan industries.  Rationalisation and horizontal
integration, particularly in the Nordrhein-Westfalen area, produced a number of holding
companies which were headed by a Konzernobergesellschaft, and contained Montan firms
as parts of a more diverse production profile.  A new law was required in order to clarify the
conditions under which employees in such companies were entitled to Montan
codetermination rights, which were significantly more advantageous to unions than in other
industries.  The firms affected in this way were Thyssen, Salzgitter, Mannesmann and
Klöckner.  For an overview of the strategies of reconstruction in the Montan industry, see
Vitols (1993).
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significantly limited forms.  The signature quota for elections to works councils
was reduced to 5% rather than 3% (as demanded by the CSU); each union
represented in the firm, however, was vested with a right to nominate official
candidates (Vorschlagsrecht), and was entitled to a representative for
automatic inclusion on the Betriebsrat’s electoral committee.  Most significantly
of all, however, proportional representation was required to distribute positions
on works council committees, but only among all groups that received over 25%
of the total vote.  This important concession to employers’ and CDA pressure
effectively preserved the DGB monopoly over works council committee work,
and of the influential chairs and sabbatical positions in works council business.
What remained of the initial proposal to democratise works council politics was
little more than mere legislative compliance with the Constitutional court’s
requirement for lowering of the threshold for candidacy.
The second proposal, to establish middle management committees or
Sprecherausschüsse, was similarly weakened.  The FDP had urged the
coalition to accept that the committees could not only make binding agreements
with management concerning the leitende Angestellte, but also that they should
possess a power of veto over deals between the Betriebsrat and management.
In late October 1988 the coalition, again under heavy pressure from both the
‘pro-employers’ and ‘pro-labour’ wings of the CDU, rejected this suggestion as
an unwarranted attack on the powers of the Betriebsrat, replacing the right to
veto with a right merely to be notified.  Restricting the powers of the
Sprecherausschüsse was coupled with a restricted definition of those workers
who could be classified as middle managers.  The law expressed three
definitional criteria40, but provided that in the event of doubt, the individual must
receive over DM 111,000 per year to qualify as a middle manager.  This was a
sizeable limitation of the pool of workers whom the FDP had wanted to be
counted as middle managers, and hence limited the extent to which the
committees could splinter the representation of the workforce inside
companies.
The price that the CDA paid for its successful opposition to the first two
proposals, however, was to lose the extension of codetermination rights over
the introduction of new technology.  Although known to be sympathetic to the
move, Blüm maintained during the final reading of the codetermination bill on
December 1st 1988 that to give the Betriebsrat powers over decisions
concerning production and technology would be to “turn the works constitution
on its head”.  The Betriebsrat, he suggested, was not a “co-entrepreneur”, but a
representative of worker interests.  What remained from the work of the Müller
commission was the extension of consultative and notificatory rights on plans to
introduce new technology, but no more.
                                                          
40
  Individuals were leitende Angestellte if: a) they had been classified as such at the last
Betriebsrat election, or b) they belonged to a management group within the firm, or c) they
received an annual salary.  More generally, the law suggested that middle managers were
those employees who, as a rule, made decisions free from the directions of others.
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4. Conclusion: Employers interests and coalition politics
How much of a difference have the reforms made to economic governance in
(West) Germany?  Appendix 1 (a and b) shows the results of works council
elections, across all industries, between 1975 and 1994.  Despite the lowering
of the signature threshold in 1989, and the provisions for strengthening the right
of minority unions to nominate their own listed candidates, the DGB unions
recorded their highest total vote in works council elections since passage of the
1972 legislation.  Other union confederations, whom the legislation had been
intended to strengthen, continued to fare poorly after 1989, while the non-
unionised representatives maintained their share of around 25% of the vote.
These trends were the same, if not magnified still further, in the distribution of
works council chairmanships, shown in Appendix 1b.  Examining election
results in the strongest and largest industrial sector, the metalworking sector,
confirms this picture (see table 1 below).  IG-Metall’s share of Betriebsrat seats
has remained hovering around the 81-82% mark consistently since 1957, and
the reforms of the Kohl administration have had no discernible effect on the
relative shares of the non-DGB unions.
Table 1: Results of works council votes in the metalworking sector since
1957 (as % of total vote)
IG-Metall
reps.
DAG reps. CGM reps. Unorganised
reps.
1957 81.7 - - 13.5
1959 81.6 4.3 0.4 13.7
1961 82.2 4.4 0.5 12.9
1963 82.1 4.0 0.8 13.1
1965 82.6 3.6 0.9 12.9
1968 82.6 3.4 0.6 13.4
1972 81.3 2.6 0.4 15.7
1975 83.3 2.3 0.5 13.9
1978 84.5 2.0 0.6 12.7
1981 83.1 1.9 0.5 14.3
1984 83.3 1.9 0.6 14.0
1987 82.4 1.7 0.5 15.2
[January 1st 1989: Works council reforms (including Minderheitenschutz) come
into force]
1990 81.5 1.6 0.6 16.3
1994 81.1 1.3 0.4 17.3
Source: I.G. Metall (1995), p. 5.
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In short, the codetermination reforms have had no detrimental impact on the
strength of the main German trade union movement, the DGB, and thus have
not undermined the principle of Einheitsgewerkschaft.  The establishment of
Sprecherausschüsse has also had a minimal effect on negotiations within firms
- with the exception of the narrow set of issues which solely concerns middle
management, the works council has remained the main venue for
management-worker consultations and bargaining.41
The mildness of the impact of the reforms contrasts strongly with the
intensity of discussion and political debate that preceded Parliament’s assent in
December 1988.  Why was so much political effort devoted towards a
legislative package that proved to be of so little consequence?  The account
given here suggests that the attempt to weaken the solidarity of union
representation in the workplace was one spearheaded by groups within the
ruling coalition, but opposed not only by unions themselves, but also by
employers and their associations.  This opposition, clearly and consistently
articulated before and during the negotiations over the various proposals,
contradicts the presumed interest of employers in weakening organised labour,
and can only be understood in the light of the characteristic patterns of
organisation and incentives in German industrial production.  Works councils
can serve an important co-ordinating function in maintaining flexible production
amenable to technological innovation, but in order to do this they must retain
internally a unified representation of worker interests.  Opposing the reforms to
codetermination was thus tantamount to defending one of the key mechanisms
of private governance in the face of a politically motivated attack on the labour
movement.
Employers associations pressed their case independently, but also in
transient political alliances with a number of groups within the coalition - with
the FDP over the new technology issue, with the CDA over the establishment of
Sprecherausschüsse, and with the CDU’s Wirtschaftsflügel over all three main
issues.  The fragmentation of interests within the coalition was the second
factor that ‘disarmed’ the proposals.  Divisions between groups comprising the
Christian-Liberal coalition government enabled the CDU leadership first to delay
a commitment to pursuing the reforms, and second to use the groups’
reluctance to embrace each other’s proposals to dilute the substance of the
reforms.  The clear preference of the leadership throughout the negotiations
was for a legislative reform package that would offend as few electoral groups
as possible.  Complexities involved in coalition bargaining are usually
interpreted as objective obstacles to the ability of elites to propel change.  In
this case, however, it is the CDU leadership that found itself in the position of
applying the brakes on the more radical demands of groups within the coalition,
as well as skilfully playing off these groups against each other.  In this sense,
                                                          
41
  See Richardi (1991), Martens (1988).
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the dictates of coalition bargaining enabled the CDU leadership to pursue a
moderating strategy in the face of radical demands.
The case of reforming codetermination in the 1980s exemplifies a number
of interesting structural features about the configuration of interests in the
German political economy.  First, the reforms were quite clearly an attempt by
groups within the coalition to weaken the monopoly of the DGB in works
councils, and thus indirectly to undermine both the representational authority of
works councils and the cherished principle of Einheitsgewerkschaft.42  It is
clearly untenable to maintain that there was no sizeable support for weakening
German unions during and prior to the 1980s.  Secondly, however, the groups
supporting this attack were not supported by the majority party leadership in the
coalition.  Chancellor Kohl and Norbert Blüm resisted radical reforms not
because of ideological opposition - their sympathies were clearly mixed - but
because of the electoral (and reputational) liability that the reforms would incur,
both among potential voters and among existing constituents and organisations
under the coalition’s umbrella.  Unlike the case of the UK under Mrs. Thatcher,
it was not possible in West Germany to concentrate the costs of policies
recommended on economic or ideological grounds (i.e. to deregulate the
German labour market, increase management autonomy, etc.) on groups which
could be clearly identified as ‘opponents’.  This is in large part because of the
strong link that exists between the CDU and the German union movement,
through the institutional link provided by the Social Committees.
Thirdly, the case confirms the view that the interests and political strategies
of employers are central to an understanding of the feasibility of governments’
attempts to reform economic governance structures.  Employers and their
representative associations, united in their scepticism of the value of reforms
that were supposedly to their advantage, managed to water down each of the
proposals to which they objected, largely as a result of alliances struck with
groups within the ruling coalition.  In addition, however, the case also confirms
the suspicion that it is erroneous to presume an affinity of interests between
employers and conservative parties in government.  Undermining the strength
of unions and of works councils was a priority for the FDP, the ‘neoliberal wing’
of the CDU, and the CSU, but not of the German employers confederation, who
                                                          
42
  Even the reasonably conservative Frankfurter Rundschau observed with some regret that the
reforms amounted to such an assault on German unions: “The disputed change to the Works
Constitution Act is not in essence about protecting minority groups or improving democracy,
rather quite the opposite.  The workers, clearly the weaker group in the case of confrontation
with the employers, will be fragmented by the law: the competition between unions will lead to
paralysis and blockage.  The representation of workers would have to take place in a
committee bringing together (party) political interests from right to left, from employer-friendly
groups to revolutionary groups.  These plans are - more directly even than the disputed
reforms to paragraph 116 of the Work Promotion Act - a further landmark in the remodelling
of the Republic.”  (Frankfurter Rundschau, 1986)
26
complained consistently that the reforms were motivated by political rather than
economic considerations.  Only by appreciating this difference in interests, and
their source, can we understand the paradox that the greatest constraint on
reforms that were designed to advance the interests of firms and managers
was provided by employers themselves.
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Appendix 1a: Works Council Election Results in West Germany from 1975-1994 (% of votes 
per Union confederation)
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Appendix 1b
(soon to come...)
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Appendix 2: Distribution of support and opposition for codetermination
reforms among key groups (1985-8)
